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Mutuality of Estoppel and Judgments of Patent Invalidity
The Rule of Triplett v. Lowell Modified
The University of Illinois Foundation' brought a patent infringement action
against Winegard Company in the Southern District of Iowa. The court de-
termined that the patent claims sued upon were invalid as "obvious to one
ordinarily skilled in the art."' The Eighth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.3 Before the court in Iowa had ruled, the Foundation
filed suit against a customer of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories in the Northern
District of Illinois, basing its suit in part on the patent subsequently held in-
valid in the Iowa decision. Blonder-Tongue contended that the patent was in-
valid. The district court noted that the patent had since been held invalid by
the Iowa federal court, but rejected that decision as binding on the basis of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Triplett v. Lowell.4 The patent was determined valid
and infringed.! The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this
finding' and certiorari was granted.! Held, vacated and remanded: A patentee
is estopped to assert the validity of a patent that has been declared invalid in
a prior suit against a different defendant, unless the patentee demonstrates that
he did not have a full and fair opportunity, procedurally, substantively, and
evidentially to litigate the validity of his patent in the prior suit. Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971).
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PRECLUSION BY JUDGMENT
The principle of finality of judgment "is founded upon the generally recog-
nized public policy that there must be some end to litigation and that when one
'The University of Illinois Foundation was the assignee of a United States patent on
"Frequency Independent Unidirectional Antennas." University of Illinois Found'n v. Wine-
gard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
2 Id. at 419. The court disposed of the case on the basis of obviousness, the test of which
was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966). In order for a patent to be valid it must be an invention. To be an invention the
article must go a step beyond the knowledge and existing skills of the art in that area. That
is, the article must not be such that one ordinarily skilled in the art could have conceived of
and created the article-it must be "nonobvious." The court found the combination of ele-
ments comprising the Foundation's patent suggested by prior art. Thus, a mere combination
of old elements known in the art did not rise to the level of an invention, no matter how
much of an improvement over previous antennas it might have been. For a further discussion
of the tests to be applied in these matters see Kell-Dot Indus., Inc. v. Graves, 361 F.2d 25
(8th Cir. 1966); American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1966).
2 University of Illinois Found'n v. Winegard Co., 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
4297 U.S. 638 (1936). The court found Triplett disposing of any effect the Winegard
decision might have on the case before it: "This court is, of course, free to decide the case
at bar on the basis of the evidence before it . . . . Although a patent has been adjudged
invalid in another patent infringement action against other defendants, patent owners can-
not be deprived 'of the right to show, if they can, that, as against defendants who have not
previously been in court, the patent is valid and infringed.'" University of Illinois Found'n
v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., Civil No. 66-C-567 (N.D. Ill., filed June 27, 1968).
'University of Illinois Found'n v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., Civil No. 66-C-567 (N.D.
Ill., filed June 27, 1968).
' University of Illinois Found'n v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.
1970).
7400 U.S. 864 (1970). Certiorari was granted due to the conflict between the circuit
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appears in court to present his case, is fully heard, and the contested issue is
decided against him, he may not later renew the litigation in another court.""
The enforcement of this principle has been achieved largely through the re-
lated doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.'
The general rule of res judicata is that a final judgment upon the merits of
a cause of action, entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, binds the parties
and their privies'" to every matter litigated or which could have been litigated
to sustain or defeat the claim in issue." The conclusive effect of the first judg-
ment upon an attempted second suit on the same claim or cause of action is
said to occur through the operation of "bar" or "merger."1 If the plaintiff pre-
vails in the first suit, his cause of action is merged into the judgment, precluding
recovery again on that claim except in a suit on the judgment. If the defendant
prevails, the plaintiff is barred from suing him again on the same cause of
action. Because of the emphasis on prevention of relitigation of the same
cause of action, these features of res judicata have been entitled "claim pre-
clusion" by one authority." While the term res judicata has often been used by
the courts to include finality of a prior judgment in a later suit on a different
cause of action, that use is technically incorrect. The principle of res judicata
is applied much more narrowly when the second action is between the same
parties but is based upon a different cause of action. In those cases the prior
judgment operates as an estoppel only as to those matters placed in issue or
points controverted, the determination of which were necessary in order to
render the decision.'
Since the cause of action involved in the second proceeding is not swallowed
by the judgment in the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which
were not at issue in the first proceeding, even though such points might have
been tendered and decided at that time. But matters which were actually liti-
gated and determined in the first proceeding cannot later be relitigated.
Once a party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party, he
courts as to the validity of the patent. The issue of the continuing validity of Triplett v.
Lowell was submitted to the parties by the Supreme Court in a subsequent order. See note
52 infra, and accompanying text.
8Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). Moreover, a litigant should not have
to face the same claims or issues in court more than once. Passailaigue v. Herron, 38 F.2d
775, 776 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 845 (1930). See also A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
5 626, at 1318-19 (5th ed. 1925).
' Stare decisis and comity are often included in discussions of judicial finality. See gen-
erally 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.401 (2d ed. 1965).
'"RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83-92 (1942) deals with the application of pre-
clusion of a prior judgment to persons in privity with parties. The general rule of privity
has been stated as follows: "Privity is a word which expresses the idea that as to cer-
tain matters and in certain circumstances persons who are not parties to an action but who
are tonnected with it in their interests are affected by the judgment with reference to in-
terests involved in the action as if they were parties." Id. § 83, comment a.
" See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351 (1877).
" RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 45, comments a, b (1942).
"SVestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REV. 27, 28 (1964).
14 Because the parties are precluded from relitigating an issue actually and necessarily
determined in the prior action, Professor Vestal has termed this bar to relitigation as "issue
preclusion," as distinguished from the "claim preclusion" of res judicata. Id. at 28. RE-
STATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment c (1942), provides that a question of fact
put in issue by the pleadings and submitted to the trier of fact, once determined, is actually
litigated and the judgment is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent suit on a differ-
ent cause of action.
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cannot later renew that duel. In this sense, res judicata is usually and more
accurately referred to as estoppel by judgment, or collateral estoppel ... .
Collateral estoppel originally applied only to instances in which the party
seeking to invoke the prior judgment and the party against whom it was being
asserted were both parties (or privies) in the first action. This requirement is
most often referred to as mutuality of estoppel. Since its inception it has been
the source of extensive comment and criticism. "
Mutuality of estoppel means that the party seeking to invoke a prior judg-
ment in his favor must also have been bound by that prior judgment had it
been decided adversely to his interest.17 The origin of the rule is not certain,
but it has been firmly entrenched in our judicial system for well over 100
years." Due process' and "sportsmanship""0 have been used as bases for its
"Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948), citing RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS § 68, 70 (1942); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1942).
16 The list of articles and other works discussing the merits or faults of mutuality is ex-
tensive. Some of these works, several of which are primarily directed to its relation to patent
law, are: RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, supra
note 9, 5 0.412, .441; Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Evans & Robins, The Demise of Mutuality in Col-
lateral Estoppel (The Second Round Patent Suit-The Not-So-Instant Replay), 24 OKLA.
L. REV. 179 (1971); Lieberman & Nelson, In Rem Invalidity-A Two-Sided Coin, 53 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 9 (1971); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments,
35 TUL. L. REV. 301 (1961); Rollins, In Rem Invalidity: A Solution in Search of a Prob-
lea?, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 561 (1970); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and join-
der of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables:
Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27 (1964); Comment, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non-Party, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
'7 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
"
6 See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877).
"
6 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918).
"Jeremy Bentham took issue with the fair play-sportsmanship analysis of mutuality.
Bentham wrote:
Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence against a
stranger, the contrary judgment shall not be evidence for him. If the rule
itself is a curious one, the reason given for it is still more so:- 'Nobody can
take benefit by a verdict, who had not been prejudiced by it, had it gone
contrary:' a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the
gaming-table to the bench . . . . It is right enough that a verdict obtained
by A against B should not bar the claim of a third party C; but that it should
not be evidence in favour of C against B, seems the very height of absurdity.
J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J.
Bowring ed. 1843).
However, one commentator who defends the doctrine asserts that the above statement
has been taken out of context and misapplied. He finds Bentham supporting mutuality in
the following passage:
One remarkable circumstance is, that the whole body of the rules of law
relating to the subject are, with a very small number of exceptions, exclusion-
ary. Even a decision given in a former cause is said not to be conclusive
evidence; and then an exclusion is put upon the whole mass of evidence, how-
soever constituted, which might have been capable of being presented on the
other side.
In saying this, enough has already been said to satisfy anyone, who has as-
sented to what was said in a former chapter concerning adscititious evidence,
that nearly the whole of the established rules on this subject, except to the
extent of the single and very limited case in which it was there seen that the
exclusion is proper, are bad. Accordingly, the rule that a judgment directly
upon the point is conclusive in any future cause between the same parties, is
a good rule-it is almost the only one that is.
Greenbaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1, 9 n.35
(1969) (emphasis added), quoting J. BENTHAM, supra, at 170.
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application. Exceptions began to appear in the strict application of mutuality
to avoid inherently unfair results, with one of the earliest and most common
exceptions arising in the area of liability of a principal for the torts of his
agent. In this area a prior finding of the absence of liability on the part of the
agent may be asserted against the plaintiff who seeks to recover from the prin-
cipal for the same injury."'
The modern history of mutuality goes far beyond the finding of exceptions
to the rule. It begins with the wholesale rejection of mutuality in the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Ass'n.' Justice Traynor's opinion found no compelling reason for
blindly accepting the doctrine as applicable in all instances. He stated:
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are per-
tinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits?
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?"
Bernhard has not led to complete abandonment of mutuality by the courts. Yet
the statement made by the Supreme Court in 1936 in Triplett v. Lowell that
any abandonment would be supported by "[n]either reason nor authority""4
can no longer be accepted.
The present attitude of the courts toward mutuality as a necessary con-
comitant of collateral estoppel is in a state of flux. The New York courts be-
lieve "the doctrine of mutuality is a dead letter."' But this is hardly the case
nationwide. While the state courts which have confronted the issue in recent
1 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 99-100 (1942); 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER,
supra note 9, 5 0.412; Greenbaum, supra note 20; Moore & Currier, supra note 16. See
also cases cited in 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 565, 566 (1940); Comment, Privity and Mutuality
in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607, 610 (1925).
" 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). It is interesting to note that this momentous
decision received scarce comment at the time it was reported. The lone law review attention
directed at the case was Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties Nor
Privies-Two California Cases, 57 HARv. L. REV. 98 (1943).
21 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added). If the three questions posed by Justice Traynor
were answered affirmatively it seems mutuality should be rejected absolutely, thereby allow-
ing collateral estoppel to be pleaded offensively by a plaintiff against either the plaintiff or
defendant in the earlier suit. The fear that offensive use against a defendant in the prior
suit who might not have had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue would cause anoma-
lous results has led many courts to deny the use of collateral estoppel offensively when
no mutuality exists. See Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
982 (1966); Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 111 (1958); Albernay
v. City of Fall River, 346 Mass. 336, 191 N.E.2d 771 (1963). See also Currie, supra note
16; Semmel, supra note 16; Comment, supra note 16. The offensive assertion of collateral
estoppel against a former defendant has been allowed in several important cases, however.
See Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88
(3d Cir. 1969); Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana de Seguros Generales v. Jerni-
gan, 410 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1969); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894
(4th Cir. 1965); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
934 (1964); United States v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & N.D. Nev.
1962), afy'd sub nom. United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 951 (1964); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
24297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936).




years have increasingly rejected the strict application of mutuality, " there are
still other states which have reaffirmed the principle.27 The trend of the courts
seems to be toward redefining the situations in which mutuality is warranted,
based in large part on the three-question test enunciated in Bernhard. In no
other system of courts is this as apparent as in the federal courts.
The federal courts when not sitting in diversity jurisdiction are free to es-
tablish their own rules on mutuality. 8 Four circuits have specifically rejected
the requirement of mutuality in cases involving federal issues." The overriding
consideration expressed in these federal court decisions is the achievement of
judicial finality with justice. In 1950 the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit held that "the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is
the measure of the fairness of the rules of res judicata."'' The most recent ex-
position of the dominant attitude of the federal, as well as the state, courts is
that of the Fifth Circuit in Rachal v. Hill:
[Ilt is clear that the requirements of mutuality need not be met for collateral
estoppel to be applied in an action presenting a federal question in the courts
of the United States .... This is not to say, however, that a party who receives
an adverse determination of an issue in prior litigation will be forever estop-
ped from relitigating that issue under all circumstances. While the require-
ment of mutuality need no longer be met, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
will not be applied unless it appears that the party against whom the estoppel
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior pro-
ceeding and that application of the doctrine will not result in an injustice to
the party against whom it is asserted under the particular circumstances of
the case.2'
26 See, e.g., Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439,
25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962); Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260
(1934); Lynch v. Chicago Transit Authority, 62 11. App. 2d 220, 210 N.E.2d 792 (1965);
B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
"See, e.g., Stillpass v. Kenton County Airport Bd., 403 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1966); Smith
v. Preis, 396 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1965); Shaw v. Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 138 S.E.2d 520
(1964); First Nat'l Bank v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St. 395, 199 N.E.2d 863
(1964); Booth v. Kirk, 53 Tenn. App. 139, 381 S.W.2d 312 (1964). In fact, the recent
California case of Great Western Furniture Co. v. Porter Corp., 238 Cal. App. 2d 502, 48
Cal. Rptr. 76 (1965), points up the fact that the matter is still open in that state. The
court stated that "the general rule is that there must be identity of parties to the actions
before the doctrine [collateral estoppel] can become operative." Id. at 508, 48 Cal. Rptr.
at 81.
28See, e.g., Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327
F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cit. 1964).
9 See Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cit. 1970); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d
944 (2d Cir. 1964); Gibson v. United States, 211 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1954); United States
v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141 (7th Cit. 1944). In 1970 Professor Moore, in a sup-
plement to his treatise on federal practice, stated that "[aldmittedly, the trend in the federal
courts is away from the rigid requirements of mutuality advocated herein." 1B J. MOORE
& T. CURRIER, supra note 9, 5 0.412[1] (Supp. 1971). The other circuits seem to be in
agreement, as determined from opinions handed down in nonfederal issues. See, e.g., Lober
v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cit. 1969); Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d
894 (4th Cir. 1965); Haddad v. Border Express, Inc., 300 F.2d 885 (1st Cit. 1962);
Davis v. McKinnon & Monney, 266 F.2d 870 (6th Cit. 1959); People v. Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co., 242 F.2d 474 (10th Cit. 1956); United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
709 (E.D. Wash. & N.D. Nev. 1962), afl'd sub nom. United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d
370 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
'
0 Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865
(1950).
Si 435 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1970).
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However, prior to the decision in Blonder-Tongue strict mutuality was the rule
in patent litigation under Triplett v. Lowell."
II. MUTUALITY IN PATENT LITIGATION-PRO AND CON
The battle lines had formed long before the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in Blonder-Tongue." The war was waged on the issues of public interest,
judicial economy, and competitive advantage.
Public Interest. A patent is a constitutionally sanctioned monopoly. 4 Its purpose
is public benefit from the encouragement and development of inventions. On
the other hand a very real public interest exists in granting this monopoly
right to only those inventions which meet the statutory requirements.' Anti-
mutuality advocates feel that it is anomalous that after an adjudication on the
merits that a patent is invalid, the patentee may continue to reap the benefits
of the monopoly. Mutuality's defenders put the shoe on the other foot by re-
plying that it is also in the public interest that a patent, properly granted, be
ultimately upheld.' They caution that not to allow the patentee the advantages
of mutuality will weaken our patent system upon which our industrial nation
so heavily relies. "Who will spend the vast sums of money needed to develop
and test a new product, even one having vast potential for promoting the com-
mon good, such as a new medicine .. . , if he does not have some assurance
that he can recover the expenses of such testing as well as those incurred with
other products which fail?"3 In response to this argument it is asserted that
the very same economic evil is reason for abandoning mutuality. A non-
patentee manufacturer has a vital interest in knowing whether a patent is
valid or invalid before he incurs royalty or licensing costs or risks liability for
infringement."
Judicial Economy. The opponents of traditional mutuality believe that its re-
moval from the realm of patent litigation would significantly reduce the
number of subsequent suits filed on already crowded trial dockets.' The
"grave" effect of relitigation of patents is challenged by citing statistics which
show that of all cases filed in the federal courts only 1.2 percent are patent
cases40 and only 62 out of 6,057 patent suits commenced between 1949 and
,1297 U.S. 638 (1936).
' See Kananen, Comments and Observations on Res Judicata and Patent Law, 18 W.
RES. L. REv. 103 (1966); Lieberman & Nelson, supra note 16; Rollins, supra note 16.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
' Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969).
"
8 Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 978 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
8" Brief for Respondent at 21, Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois
Found'n, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).38 Lieberman & Nelson, supra note 16, at 19.
38 "A patentee, having been afforded the opportunity to exhaust his remedy of appeal
from a holding of invalidity, has had his 'day in court' and should not be allowed to harass
others on the basis of an invalid claim. There are few, if any, logical grounds for permitting
him to clutter crowded court dockets and to subject others to costly litigation." THE PRES-
IDENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL
ARTS 38, 39 (1966). See also Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 1955)
(Schnackenberg, J., concurring).4 Approximately 1.29 of the cases commenced between 1959 and 1968 were patent
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1958 (or approximately 1 percent) were relitigated."' Therefore, it is argued
that the crowded court docket problem is de minimis. Moreover, since a num-
ber of the relitigated cases found the patents valid, the advocates of mutuality
assert that this confirms their argument that the first decision rendered may
often be wrong." While admittedly the issues placed before the courts require
a technical understanding few American jurists achieve,43 the counter-argument
is that, nonetheless, a strict requirement of mutuality is not justified. The
patentee is a litigant who can often choose his opponent and forum," and,
most importantly, a litigant who has little right to complain about an in-
sufficient record or presentation. The patent laws create a presumption of
validity on an issued patente which thereby places the burden of proof of
invalidity upon the defendant. The issues now become whether the patentee
was accorded his day in court, and whether the determination of this fact will
itself result in increased judicial proceedings."
Competitive Advantage. The competitive disadvantages forced upon non-
patentee defendants suggest a strong argument for ending any inflexible re-
quirement of mutuality. The effect of the law is "that infringers or licensees
who lose on the issue of validity must compete at an economic disadvantage or
get out of the market, while those who win can compete on at least an equal
footing with the patentee though employing the same device as the loser."'
Further, since the average minimum cost of conducting a patent infringement
suit to judgment is estimated to be $50,000 to $100,000 for each party, with
the costs frequently being as high as a million dollars each for the litigants,"8
a prospective defendant may be compelled to obtain a license and pay royal-
ties rather than undergo the arduous efforts and expense of an infringement
suit. 
9
cases. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTs, REPORT (1969), cited
in Brief for Respondent, supra note 37, at 15 n.11.
4'STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT LITIGATION STA-
TISTICS (Comm. Print 1961).
"See opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158,
162 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342 F.2d 531 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1965). Consider also the forum shopping factors involved. See note
71 intra.
"
3Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 33, Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Illinois Found'n, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
'See Rollins, supra note 16, at 564.
4'35 U.S.C. § 282 (1971).
, See Brief for United States, supra note 43, at 22; Brief for Petitioner at 17, Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found'n, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Lieberman &
Nelson, supra note 16, at 27, 52; Moore & Currier, supra note 16.
41Lieberman & Nelson, supra note 16, at 21.
8 Gorn, Economic Value of Patents, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND IN-
VENTION MANAGEMENT 221, 222 (1964).
4, "Unless holdings of invalidity are given some preclusive force, the expensive prospect
of defending an action for infringement brought under even an invalidated patent may
suffice to force alleged infringers to pay royalties rather than challenge the patent as a de-
fense." Nickerson v. Kutschera, 419 F.2d 983, 988 n.4 (3d Cir. 1969) (Hastie, J., dis-
senting); accord, Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1942); Picard v. United
Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir. 1942).
An opposin argument is that it is just as costly and unfair to require a patentee to
litigate the validity of his patent as against the world in what may be a relatively small suit
for royalties. Semmel, supra note 16, at 1465.
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III. BLONDER-TONGUE LABORATORIES, INC. V. UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS FOUNDATION
The partial overruling of Triplett v. Lowell" by Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation"M was a product of the Court's
own initiative rather than at the behest of either party. The original questions
presented by the petition for writ of certiorari dealt with the issues of validity
of the patents involved. The Supreme Court raised the issue of the continued
validity of Triplett sua sponte,52 justifying this action on the basis of "well-
recognized exceptions" to the rule that only the questions raised in the petition
will be considered by the Court."3 Even after the issue was raised, neither
Blonder-Tongue nor the Foundation argued for reversal or modification of
Triplett in their briefs." However, Blonder-Tongue did concede during oral
argument that a modification of Triplett might be appropriate." The primary
source from which the Court drew its opinion was the brief submitted by the
United States as amicus curiae. The Government's position was that Triplett
should be modified to allow for a determination on a case-by-case basis
whether collateral estoppel should be applied to prevent "the obvious waste
motion of cases which present identical issues of law and fact,"" and whether
the plaintiff had been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues.
Justice White, speaking for the Court, first undertook to recount the history
of mutuality of collateral estoppel. He noted that as recently as 1968 lower
federal courts were distinguishing Triplett in order to bypass its effects."7 The
judge-made doctrine of mutuality was going through a process of erosion and
fundamental change accompanied by other developments which allowed the
courts to dispose of cases swiftly but justly. While the "mutations in estoppel
doctrine" were not before the Court for "wholesale approval or rejection,"
nonetheless they gave the Court cause "to re-examine whether mutuality of
estoppel is a viable rule where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a
10297 U.S. 638 (1936).
51402 U.S. 313 (1971).
52 The court issued an order requesting that, in addition to the questions tendered in the
petition for certiorari, the parties in the case address themselves to the following questions
in their briefs and oral arguments: (1) Should the holding of Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S.
638 (1936), that a determination of patent invalidity is not res judicata as against the
patentee in subsequent litigation against a different defendant, be adhered to? (2) If not,
does the determination of invalidity in the Winegard litigation bind the respondents in this
case? 402 U.S. at 317.
53 U.S. SUP. CT. R. 23(1) (c). See R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKMAN, JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 418 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurkland eds.
1951); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 6.37 (4th ed. 1969).
The Court discusses the action at 402 U.S. at 320, n.6. Two previous departures from the
usual practice were cited as further precedent for their action: Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
""Secondly, we are unprepared to urge the modification of established doctrines, such as
res judicata, merely for the convenience of placing another tool in the hands of the patent
busters." Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 46, at 13.
402 U.S. at 320, n.6.
Brief for the United States, supra note 43, at 36.
57 See, e.g., the case of Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Electronics
Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 317-18 (C.D. Cal. 1968) where the defendant in an infringement
suit was granted a summary judgment by noting that in Triplett the statements as to mu-
tuality were dicta and moreover conflicted with not only precedent but with the spirit of
certain provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted after Triplett.
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patent once a federal court has declared it to be invalid." 8 Phrasing the issue
in terms of the modern trend or test, the Court asked "whether it is any
longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for
judicial resolution of the same issue."'
The Court did not believe that holding a patentee-plaintiff to one determi-
nation of validity would remove the safeguard against incorrect judgments
which mutuality supposedly offers. Realizing the technical difficulties inherent
in patent disputes the Court nonetheless observed that "issues of nonobvious-
ness present difficulties 'comparable to those encountered daily by the courts
in such frames of reference as negligence and scienter, and should be amen-
able to a case-by-case development.' ,0 Moreover, if the issues in a patent
litigation were so vague and imperceptible in the first suit, what reason exists
to say the judgment in the second suit would be any less likely to be in error?
The characteristic patent suit is marked by careful discovery and evidentiary
planning which leads to a complete record before the court. In any case, col-
lateral estoppel, just as mutuality, should not be applied automatically. The
patentee-plaintiff must be given an opportunity to demonstrate, if possible,
"that he did not have 'a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evi-
dentially to pursue his claim the first time.' "' The mere fact that technical
intricacies exist in patent infringement actions is not sufficient to justify reliti-
gation of the same issues for the sole reason that mutuality is absent.
The Court heavily documented its position that the sheer cost (both in terms
of money and time) of patent infringement suits caused unjust results. Taking
note of the statutory presumption of validity of a patent, it was observed that
the more vigorously a defendant maintains his position, the more expensive
the litigation is for him. Consequently, the potential defendant will likely
accept a license or remove himself from the competition altogether. The time
and money spent on litigation of a patent initially held invalid could be put
to far better use in research and development.
The monopoly granted under a patent has the same economic consequences
attending any other monopoly. Therefore, the public interest is strong in not
allowing devices which lack the requirements of patentability a continuing
monopolistic effect. Justice White traced the precedent in this area to bolster
this proposition. Restrictions or conditions placed upon licensees which tended
to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly were in-
validated in Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Investment Co." A manufacturer of a
device has been allowed to test the validity of another's patent under the
Declaratory Judgment Act" before he is sued for infringement." A defendant
in an infringement suit has been allowed to counterclaim for treble damages
5s402 U.S. at 327.
19 Id. at 328. The issue of whether the litigant against whom the estoppel is asserted has
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these same issues is not necessarily closed by a prior
determination of invalidity.
"
0Id. at 331, citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
61Id. at 333, citing Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D. Mass.
1960).
' 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
6328 U.S.C. § 2201 (1971).
"Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952).
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under the Clayton Ace' for alleged fraud on the Patent Office in the procure-
ment of the patent."0 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins" allowed a licensee to challenge the
validity of his licensor's patent on a suit for royalties, thereby overturning long-
standing precedent to the contrary. Obviously, the Court has been less than
sympathetic to the plight of patentees whose patents have once been declared
invalid. In ruling that res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative de-
fenses to be pleaded under rule 8 (c) 8 the Court concluded:
When these judicial developments are considered in the light of our con-
sistent view-last presented in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins-that the holder of a
patent should not be insulated from the assertion of defenses and thus allowed
to exact royalties for the use of an idea that is not in fact patentable or that
is beyond the scope of the patent monopoly granted, it is apparent that the
uncritical acceptance of the principle of mutuality of estoppel expressed in
Triplett v. Lowell is today out of place. Thus, we conclude that Triplett should
be overruled to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing a
charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid."9
IV. CONCLUSION
Blonder-Tongue surely marks the demise of the traditional doctrine of mu-
tuality of estoppel in the federal courts. But just as surely it does not consti-
tute a cure for every problem in patent infringement litigation. Although the
Court remarked that the modern trend favors defensive use of collateral estop-
pel sans mutuality, it did not settle the question of offensive use because the
case apparently did not present such questions. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit has ruled in Boutell v. Volk"h that Blonder-Tongue does not
authorize the offensive use of collateral estoppel to establish validity of a
patent against a second defendant. The possibilities are very real that a patent
may be sued upon and found valid in several circuits, each judgment being
inconclusive of validity in the others. The next suit may well be found against
the patentee, holding his patent invalid. Should any future defendant be al-
lowed to prevail on a plea of collateral estoppel based on the one finding of
invalidity? The answer, unfortunately, does not really matter-for whether
it is allowed or not the patent will be regarded as valid in some circuits, invalid
in others. Thus, the same evils of some competitors being required to seek
licenses while others are not required to do so, and the uncertainties of whether
to obtain a license or risk an infringement suit are as alive as ever. Once a
patent is held valid any later decision of invalidity immediately raises the prob-
lem. The judicial finality sought by the Court will never occur unless it is the
first decision, whether of validity or invalidity, that is given preclusive effect."'
65 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1971).
"
0Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
67395 U.S. 653 (1969).
68 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
09 402 U.S. at 349, 350.
70449 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1971).
"'Some will argue that to give the initial decision full preclusive effect will increase
forum shopping. But isn't that the case even under the present decision? In order to stand
the best chance of not having its patent declared invalid, the patentee will choose the weak-
est possible defendant in the most favorable circuit. That is, the patentee plaintiff will choose
the Fifth Circuit (with a 59.7% finding of validity), or the Tenth Circuit (with a favorable
invalidity percentage of only 38.1%), rather than the Third Circuit (with a 77.5% finding
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